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Abstract 
 
Most commentary on Zimbabwe’s land reform insists that agricultural production has almost 
totally collapsed, that food insecurity is rife, that rural economies are in precipitous decline, that 
political ‘cronies’ have taken over the land and that farm labour has all been displaced. This 
paper however argues that the story is not simply one of collapse and catastrophe; it is much 
more nuanced and complex, with successes as well as failures. The paper provides a summary 
of some of the key findings from a ten-year study in Masvingo province and the book 
Zimbabwe’s Land Reform: Myths and Realities. The paper documents the nature of the radical 
transformation of agrarian structure that has occurred both nationally and within the province, 
and the implications for agricultural production and livelihoods. A discussion of who got the land 
shows the diversity of new settlers, many of whom have invested substantially in their new 
farms. An emergent group ‘middle farmers’ is identified who are producing, investing and 
accumulating. This has important implications – both economically and politically – for the 
future, as the final section on policy challenges discusses. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Zimbabwe’s land reform has had a bad press. Images of chaos, destruction and violence have 
dominated the coverage. While these have been part of the reality, there is also another side of 
the story. There have been important successes which must be taken into account if a more 
complete picture is to be offered. This paper argues that the story is not simply one of collapse 
and catastrophe; it is much more nuanced and complex, with successes as well as failures.  
 
As Zimbabwe moves forward with a new agrarian structure, a more balanced appraisal is 
needed.  This requires solid, on-the-ground research aimed at finding out what happened to 
whom and where and with what consequences. This was the aim of work carried out in 
Masvingo province since 2000 and reported in the book, Zimbabwe’s Land Reform: Myths and 
Realities (Scoones et al, 2010). This paper offers an overview of the main findings1. The 
question posed for the research was simple: what happened to people’s livelihoods once they 
got land through land reform from 2000? Yet, despite the simplicity of the question, the answers 
are extremely complex. 
 
The research involved in-depth field research in 16 land reform sites; in some sites over a 
decade from 2000. The research sites were located in four research ‘clusters’ across the 
province, involving a sample population of 400 households. Masvingo is a relatively dry 
province, with average annual rainfall ranging from around 1000mm to under 300mm. Former 
land uses of the research sites included livestock ranches (sometimes with limited irrigation 
                                               
1
 The paper draws from the book, as well as a series of feature articles prepared for the Zimbabwean 
newspaper (see http://www.ids.ac.uk/go/news/zimbabwe-s-land-reform-ten-years-on-new-study-dispels-
the-myths). 
plots), with low capitalisation and limited labour forces, as well as, for several A2 sites, irrigated 
farms, including those linked to sugar estates in the lowveld. Different types of survey were 
conducted in these sites between 2000 and 2010, including a full census (N=400 in 2007-08), a 
stratified sample survey (N=277 in 2008, stratified according to cattle ownership, a key indicator 
of wealth) and individual household biographies (N=110, across all ‘success groups’), as well as 
more qualitative observations in all sites. Records of crop production, sales and inputs were 
carried out each season, and livestock and other asset holdings were monitored, in all cases 
through recall interviews. A detailed study of investment took place in 2007-08, involving 
assessments for all households. The research team included a group of field researchers 
resident in Masvingo province – in Masvingo, Hippo Valley and Chikombedzi. The study area 
stretched from the relatively higher potential areas near Gutu to the sugar estate of Hippo Valley 
to the dry south in the lowveld, offering a picture of diverse agro-ecological conditions (Figure 
1). What we found was not what we expected. It contradicted the overwhelmingly negative 
images of land reform presented in the media, and indeed in much academic and policy 
commentary besides. In sum, the realities on the ground did not match the myths so often 
perpetuated in wider debate.  
 
Most commentary on Zimbabwe’s land reform insists that agricultural production has almost 
totally collapsed, that food insecurity is rife, that rural economies are in precipitous decline, that 
political ‘cronies’ have taken over the land and that farm labour has all been displaced. The 
reality however is much more complex. In our research we needed to ask far more sophisticated 
questions: Which aspects of agricultural production have suffered? Who is food insecure? How 
are rural economies restructuring to the new agrarian setting? And who exactly are the new 
farmers and farm labourers? By countering one myth of disaster and catastrophe, we must of 
course be wary of setting up an opposite myth of rose-tinted optimism. Instead, we should offer 
an empirically-informed view based on detailed analysis and solid evidence. This has been the 
aim of our research, and we offer a taste of the findings below. 
Figure 1: Map of Masvingo province, showing study 
areas
Of course a focus on Masvingo province gives only a partial insight into the broader national 
picture. With most land being previously extensive ranch land, with pockets of irrigated 
agriculture outside the sugar estates, it is clearly different to the Highveld around Harare, where 
highly capitalised agriculture reliant on export markets did indeed collapse and where labour 
was displaced in large numbers (Sachikonye, 2003). But the picture in the new farms of 
Masvingo is not unrepresentative of broad swathes of the rest of the country, as research 
across multiple districts, from Mazoe to Mutoko to Mangwe is now showing (Moyo et al 2009; 
Matondi  2010; plus contributions to this special issue from across the country, see Cliffe et al 
for an overview)2. Smallholder farmers have dominated the allocations under the ‘Fast Track 
Land Reform Programme’ (FTLRP), and many are doing well; surprisingly so given the parlous 
economic conditions over much of the past decade.  
 
But any good analysis must take a differentiated view, unpacking diverse trajectories; 
successes as well as failures. Contributions to this special issue demonstrate this diversity, 
much of which is encompassed in the Masvingo study. For example Zamchiya (this issue), 
shows how some high-value sites were captured by elites in Chipinge, while in peri-urban 
Goromonzi, Marongwe (2009, this issue) shows how allocation of A2 farms was manipulated by 
political connections. These were all patterns observed in Masvingo province, as shown below. 
But individual cases should not detract from a balanced overall assessment, and only a broader 
overview can provide a firm basis for thinking about future policy. Subsequent sections of this 
paper offer such an overview of the key findings from the Masvingo study, starting with a 
summary of the broader national changes before focusing on the results from Masvingo 
province. 
 
A radical change in agrarian structure 
 
Across the country, the formal land re-allocation since 2000 has resulted in the transfer of land 
to nearly 170,000 households by 2010 (Moyo, 2011a: 496). If the ‘informal’ settlements, outside 
the official ‘fast-track’ programme are added, the totals are even larger.  
 
Events since 2000 have thus resulted in a radical change in the nation’s agrarian structure 
(Table 1). At Independence in 1980, over 15m hectares was devoted to large-scale commercial 
farming, comprising around 6,000 farmers, nearly all of them white. This fell to around 12m 
hectares by 1999, in part through a modest, but in many ways successful, land reform and 
resettlement programme, largely funded by the British government under the terms of the 
Lancaster House agreement (Gunning et al 2000).  
 
The Fast Track Land Reform Programme, begun in 2000, allocated to new farmers over 4,500 
farms making up 7.6m hectares, 20% of the total land area of the country, according to 
(admittedly rough) official figures. In 2008-09 this represented over 145,000 farm households in 
A1 schemes and around 16500 further households occupying A2 plots (Rukuni et al 2009)3, 
equivalent to 11.7% of farm households in the country4.  
                                               
2
 The papers produced as part of the Livelihoods after Land Reform small grants competition show an 
extraordinary range, but again some important common themes 
(http://www.lalr.org.za/zimbabwe/zimbabwe-working-papers-1) 
3
 Total land allocations have continued to increase. Moyo (2011a:497) claims that total land allocations 
amount to nearly 9m ha by 2010, as more larger A2 farms have been allocated. 
4
 Nationally, the agrarian structure now includes smallholder farms (made up of communal area 
households (82.1%), old resettlement households (5.4%) and A1 households (10.5%) medium-scale 
farms (made up of old small-scale commercial farms (0.6%) and A2 farms (1.1%)) and large-scale farms, 
 
Table 1: Changes in the national distribution of land, 1980-2009 
 
Land category 
1980 2000 2009 
Area (million 
ha) 
Area (million ha) Area (million ha) 
Communal areas 16.4 16.4 16.4 
Old resettlement 0.0 3.5 3.5 
New resettlement: A1 0.0 0.0 4.1 
New resettlement: A2 0.0 0.0 3.5 
Small-scale commercial  
farms 
1.4 1.4 1.4 
Large-scale commercial 
farms 
15.5 11.7 3.4* 
State farms 0.5 0.7 0.7 
Urban land 0.2 0.3 0.3 
National parks and forest 
land 
5.1 5.1 5.1 
Unallocated land 0.0 0.0 0.7 
Source: derived from various government sources and compiled by the African Institute of Agrarian 
Studies * includes all large commercial farms, agro-industrial estate farms, church/trust farms, BIPPA 
farms and conservancies (Scoones et al 2010: 4). 
 
Overall, there has been a significant shift to many more, smaller-scale farms focusing on mixed 
farming, often with low levels of capitalisation. Much of this expansion of agricultural activity is 
on land which was previously under-utilised (Moyo 1998), and in the Masvingo case often 
involving a transfer of land which was used for ranching at low stocking rates with limited 
herding labour to more intensive smallholder crop and livestock production. But this is not to say 
that large-scale commercial units no longer exist. Especially important in Masvingo province is 
the estate sector, including for example the major sugar estates in the lowveld. These largely 
remained intact following land reform, with out-grower areas being transferred to sub-divided A2 
plots. Today, there are still around 3.4 m hectares under large-scale farming, some of it in very 
large holdings, such as the 350,000 hectare Nuanetsi ranch in Masvingo province5. There are, 
however, perhaps only 200 white-owned commercial farmers still operating across 117,000 ha 
nationally, complemented by 950 black-owned large scale farms on 530,000 ha (Moyo 
2011a:514). Most white-owned farms were taken over, with a substantial number of farm 
workers displaced. 
 
Two main ‘models’ have been at the centre of the land reform process since 2000 - one focused 
on smallholder production (so-called A1 schemes, either as villagised arrangements or small, 
self-contained farms) and one focused on commercial production at a slightly larger scale (so-
                                                                                                                                                       
conservancies and estates (0.4%). In other words, today 98% of all farms can be classified as 
smallholdings (Scoones et al 2010: 6). 
5
 Moyo (2011a:514-7, 2011b: 262) divides this between large scale farms, including white and black 
owned farms and new A2 farms (1.5m ha, including about 500,000ha allocated to 200 very large scale A2 
farms) and estates/conservancies/institutions (1.2m ha). However, in the absence of a detailed land audit 
these aggregate figures are prone to error, and remain estimates. 
called A2 farms). Much larger A2 farms, replicating the large-scale farms of the past, have also 
been created, many later in the land reform process (Moyo 2011a,b).  
 
In practice, the distinction between these models varies considerably, and there is much 
overlap, with some self-contained A1 schemes, for example, being very similar to smaller A2 
schemes. As Zamchiya’s study (this issue) shows, processes of land allocation, rather than their 
administrative definition, have more importance in understanding who ended up on the land and 
what happened next. Most A1 schemes, and all ‘informal’ land reform sites, were allocated 
following land invasions starting from 20006. These had diverse origins, but were usually (but 
not always) led by war veterans and involved groups of people from surrounding communal 
areas and nearby towns (Chaumba et al, 2003; Moyo 2001). More formal allocation of plots 
happened later, with the pegging of fields and settlement sites as part of the ‘fast track land 
reform programme’ (FTLRP) and the issuing of ‘offer letters’7.  
 
Depending on the pressure on the land, the local demands and often the discretion of the 
planning officers, A1 sites were demarcated as villages (with shared grazing and clustered 
homesteads) or ‘self-contained’ plots, with houses, arable fields and grazing within a single 
area. The ‘informal’ A1 sites, by contrast, were usually organised in line with local preferences. 
These sites, with their origins in land invasions, took on a particular social and political 
character, organised initially by a ‘Seven Member Committee’, often with a war veteran base 
commander in the lead. Later these became village committees, and were incorporated into 
chiefly authorities and local government administrative systems (Scoones et al 2010: 188-212). 
By contrast, A2 schemes were allocated later (from around 2002) as a result of business plan 
applications to the Provincial and District Land Committees.  
 
The membership of each of these ‘schemes’ is thus highly dependent on the politics of the 
allocation process, with final outcomes highly contingent on local situations. The land invasions, 
while of course highly politicised, and supported by ZANU-PF and the military, had diverse 
origins and participation: some were made up largely of poor, local villagers from nearby areas, 
while others involved a smaller group of organised war veterans (Hammar et al 2003; 
Marongwe 2003). In our Masvingo cases, each site was different (Scoones et al, 2010:46-51). 
A2 schemes by contrast required a formal application process, and officially there were strict 
criteria for acceptance. Many who applied were civil servants, often linked to the agriculture 
ministry, who had few strong political connections if any; although in some instances were able 
to manipulate the administrative procedures in their favour8. The most obvious, and often 
blatant, corrupt practices linked to political patronage were associated with the later allocation of 
larger A2 farms, especially around the time of the 2008 elections when the struggle for power 
and the deployment of political patronage by the ZANU-PF elite was at its height. Moyo (2011a: 
514) reports 53 large-scale A2 farms in Masvingo province across 110,719ha. 
  
In sum, the land reform has resulted in a very different farming sector, with a radically 
reconfigured agrarian structure. While the old dualism has been disrupted, with many more 
smallholder farmers on the land, elements of the large-scale farming structure remain. Yet 
despite these major changes, the new setting, as we show below, is not without considerable 
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 Exceptions exist, such as the case studied by Zamchiya (this issue) which involved A1 self-contained 
schemes allocated by the state and not through land occupations, showing more similarity with the A2 
pattern elsewhere.   
7
 These are documents providing a permit to occupy the land, but no formal title or lease. 
8
 Political manipulation of allocation processes was more common in areas close to towns (Marongwe this 
issue) and where high value crops were at stake (Zamchiya this issue).   
entrepreneurial dynamism and productive potential. This major restructuring of course has had 
knock-on consequences for the agricultural sector as a whole. Any radical reform will of course 
have a transitional phase, as production systems, markets and trading priorities readjust (Kinsey 
2003), but the key questions are how long will the transition take, and what form will the 
agriculture sector take in the longer term?  In the period between 2001 and 2009, national 
production of wheat, tobacco, coffee and tea all declined, as did the export of beef (Scoones et 
al, 2010: 148). Compared to 1990s averages, wheat production decreased by 27% and tobacco 
production by 43%, with more dramatic declines from 2006 (Moyo 2011a), yet some recovery, 
particularly for tobacco, in 2010 and 2011 (Anseeuw et al 2011). Equally, national maize 
production has become more variable, because of the reduction of irrigation facilities and 
significant droughts have resulted in shortages, with average production over this period down 
by 31% from 1990s levels. However, other crops and markets have weathered the storm and 
some have boomed. Aggregate production of small grains (sorghum and millet) has exploded, 
increasing by 163% compared to 1990s averages, while cotton production has also increased, 
up 13% on average by 2009. The agricultural sector therefore has certainly been transformed, 
and there are major problems in certain areas, but it certainly has not collapsed. 
 
Transforming land and livelihoods in Masvingo province 
 
Aggregate figures – with all the necessary caveats about their accuracy - only tell one part of 
the story. To get a sense of what is happening in the fields and on the farms, we need a more 
local focus. Only with such insights can we really begin to understand the impacts of 
Zimbabwe’s land reform. In this section, we zero in on Masvingo province in the central south 
and east of the country. 
 
In Masvingo province about 28% of the total land area was transferred as part of the FTLRP, 
according to 2009 official figures. Much of this land was previously cattle ranches, with limited 
infrastructure, low levels of employment and only small patches of arable land outside the 
irrigated lowveld areas. This was taken over by over 32,500 households on A1 sites (making up 
1.2 m hectares) and about 1,200 households in A2 areas (making up 371,500 ha), alongside 
perhaps a further 8,500 households in informal resettlement sites, as yet unrecognised by the 
government. Although there is much variation, the average size of new A2 farms is 318 
hectares, while that of A1 family farms is 37 hectares, including crop and grazing land9.  At the 
same time one million hectares (18.3% of the province) remains as large-scale commercial 
operations, including some very large farms, wildlife conservancies and estates in the lowveld 
that remained largely intact (Moyo 2011b). 
 
Table 2 offers an overview of the socio-economic characteristics of the different sites in our 
study, presented in relation to the four districts and the four different types of resettlement 
‘scheme’, highlighting the diversity of contexts, livelihood assets and strategies. Land holdings 
vary significantly between the ‘scheme’ types, with the A2 small-scale commercial units having 
the largest land areas. A1 self-contained scheme areas include both grazing and arable land, 
while A1 villagised and informal areas represent only the arable land. Maize production and sale 
varies significantly, with A1 self-contained schemes performing best and, with a few notable 
exceptions, A2 schemes performing poorly. Average crop production levels unsurprisingly 
decline between the relatively wetter sites of Gutu and Masvingo to the dry area of Mwenezi. 
Cattle ownership is highest in the A2 ranches of Mwenezi, although with stocking rates still low 
                                               
9
 The acquisition of whole farms without subdivision to create ‘large-scale A2’ farms has occurred in 
recent years and has been characterised by political corruption. In Masvingo province, these farms 
average over 2000ha.  
and cropped area minimal10. The overall profile of the new settlers is presented in the table, 
referring to the age and educational qualifications of ‘household heads’. A2 farmers tend to be 
slightly older and better educated, but overall, compared to nearby communal areas, this is a 
relatively well educated and young population.  
 
Table 2: A socio-economic profile of the study sites (average amounts across survey 
households) 
  
Cluster 
Gutu 
 
Masvingo Chiredzi Mwenezi 
Scheme 
type 
A1 self-
containe
d 
A1 
villagise
d 
A2 
A1 self-
containe
d 
A1 
villagi
sed 
A2 
Infor
mal 
A2 
A1 
villagise
d 
A1 
inform
al 
A2 
Age of 
household 
head 
39 34 43 36 40 43 37 46 n.d. 33 44 
Education
al level of 
household 
head 
Form 2 Form 2 
Form 
3 or 
higher 
Form 2 Form 2 
Form 3 
or 
higher 
Grade 
7 
Form 
3 or 
higher 
Grade 7 
Grade 
7 
Form 
2 
Land 
holding 
(ha) 
35.5 4.0 232.1 33.0 3.9 167.0 6.2 39.1 7.9 8.0 868.7 
Area 
cropped 
(ha) 
5.6 3.1 6.6 8.4 3.4 n.d. 4.6 16.8 3.6 4.0 0.5 
Cattle 
owned 
(nos) 
6.9 5.4 25.2 11.9 4.4 11.7 4.4 14.8 4.7 
 
4.9 
 
60.3 
Maize 
output in 
2006 kg 
2790 2627 3133 7385 3140 65000 2256 2582 449 104 n.d 
Sales 
(GMB and 
local) in kg 
in 2006 
1310 1157 896 5283 1766 54563 378 1357 104 0 n.d  
% owning 
a scotch 
cart 
32% 24% 20% 68% 63% 75% 40% 33% 55% 50% 64% 
House 
type (% 
with 
tin/asbesto
s roof) 
43% 40% 25% 45% 44% 100% 42% 78% 96% 100% 100% 
% 
receiving 
remittance 
44% 39% 15% n.d. 23% 0% 21% 28% 44% 52% 64% 
Source: Survey data, 2007-08 (n.d. means no data available, or not applicable) (Scoones et al 2010: 44) 
 
This radical transformation of land and livelihoods has resulted in a new composition of people 
in the rural areas, with diverse livelihood strategies. In order to understand more about who was 
doing what we undertook a ‘success ranking’ exercise in all 16 sites across Masvingo province. 
This involved a group of farmers from the area ranking all households according to their own 
criteria of success. A number of broad categories of livelihood strategy emerged from these 
investigations (following Dorward (2009) and Mushongah (2009)). These are listed in Table 3. 
 
                                               
10
 Stocking rates on the Mwenezi A2 ranches average 14.4 ha per animal, although herd sizes are 
building up. Recommended rates are around 10 ha per livestock unit for beef production in this dry area.  
Table 3: Livelihood strategies in Masvingo province 
 
Category  Livelihood strategy  
Proportion of 
households 
Dropping out 
(10.0%) 
Exit – leaving the plot 4.4% 
Chronically poor, local labour 3.3% 
Ill health affecting farming 2.2% 
Hanging in (33.6%) 
Asset poor farming, local labour 17.8% 
Keeping the plot for the future 10.3% 
Straddling across resettlement and communal areas 5.6% 
Stepping out 
(21.4%) 
Survival diversification 2.8% 
Local off-farm activities plus farming 5.3% 
Remittances from within Zimbabwe plus farming 5.0% 
Remittances from outside Zimbabwe plus farming 4.4% 
Cell phone farmers 3.9% 
Stepping up (35.0%) 
Hurudza – the ‘real’ farmers 18.3% 
Part-time farmers 10.6% 
New (semi-)commercial farmers 4.7% 
Farming from patronage 1.4% 
Source: summarised from Scoones et al (2010:228-229) 
 
Over a half of all the 400 sample households – across A1, A2 and informal resettlement sites - 
were either ‘stepping up’ – accumulating assets and regularly producing crops for sale – or 
‘stepping out’ – successfully diversifying off-farm. These households were accumulating and 
investing, often employing labour and ratcheting up their farming operations, despite the many 
difficulties being faced. But not everyone has been successful. 46.5% of households were 
finding the going tough, and were not regarded as ‘successful’ at this stage. Some were really 
struggling and only just ‘hanging in’; others were in the process of ‘dropping out’, through a 
combination of chronic poverty and ill health. Joining the land invasions and establishing new 
farms in what was often uncleared bush, previously not used for arable agriculture, was not 
easy. It required commitment, courage and much hard work. It was not for everyone.  
 
Others without start-up assets have been unable to accumulate, and have continued to live in 
poverty, reliant on the support of relatives and friends. Some have joined a growing labour force 
on the new farms, abandoning their plots in favour of often poorly-paid employment. Within the 
‘stepping out’ category, some are surviving off illegal, unsafe or transient activities that allowed 
survival but little else. Still others are straddling across two farms – one in the communal area 
and one in the new resettlement – and not really investing in the new areas, while some are 
simply keeping the plot for sons or other relatives.  
 
It is not surprising that there have been such variable outcomes. In the period since 2000 there 
has been virtually no external support. Government was broke and focused support on the elite 
few, and the NGOs and donors have shied away from the new resettlement areas for political 
reasons. Instead, most new farmers have been reliant on their own connections, enterprise and 
labour. Without support to get going, many have found it difficult, and it has been those with a 
combination of access to assets, hard work and luck that have really made it.  
 
Overall, in our study sites there is thus a core group of ‘middle farmers’ – around half of the 
population – who are successful not because of patronage support, but because of hard work. 
They can be classified as successful ‘petty commodity producers’ and ‘worker peasants’ who 
are gaining surpluses from farming, investing in the land from off-farm work and so are able to 
‘accumulate from below’ (Scoones et al. 2010; cf. Cousins 2010). This is, as discussed below, 
having a positive impact on the wider economy, including stimulating demand for services, 
consumption goods and labour.  
 
New land, new people 
 
One of the most repeated myths about Zimbabwe’s land reform is that all the land went to 
‘Mugabe’s cronies’; those with access to elite connections and benefiting from political 
patronage. This did, of course, happen, and continues to do so. Tackling such extreme 
excesses of land grabbing through a land audit, as provided for in the ‘Global Political 
Agreement’ for power sharing, remains a major challenge. But elite capture is not the whole 
story of Zimbabwe’s land reform; nor indeed the dominant one. 
 
Who got the land and what is the profile of the new settlers? Our study of 400 households 
across the 16 sites from Masvingo province showed by far the majority of the new settlers are 
ordinary people (Table 4). While ‘ordinary’ is certainly a category that lacks clarity, these are 
essentially people who had little or very poor land in the communal areas or were unemployed 
or with very poorly-paid jobs and living in town. About half of all new settler households were 
from nearby communal areas and another 18% from urban areas. These people joined the 
invasions because they needed land, and thought that the new resettlements would provide 
new livelihood opportunities. As discussed further below, this was not a politically-organised 
grouping with strong connections to ZANU-PF. The remaining third of household heads was 
made up of civil servants (16.5% overall, but increasing to around a quarter of all settlers in A1 
self-contained and A2 sites), business people (4.8% overall, but again proportionately higher in 
the A1 self-contained and A2 sites), security service personnel (3.7% overall, employed by the 
police, army and intelligence organisation) and former farm workers (6.7% overall).  
 
Table 4: Settler profiles across schemes 
 
 A1 villagised A1 self contained Informal A2 Total 
‘Ordinary’: from other rural areas 59.9 39.2 69.7 12.2 49.9 
‘Ordinary’: from urban areas 9.4 18.9 22.6 43.8 18.3 
Civil servant 12.5 28.3 3.8 26.3 16.5 
Security services 3.6 5.4 3.8 1.8 3.7 
Business person 3.1 8.2 0 10.5 4.8 
Former farm worker 11.5 0 0 5.3 6.7 
N 192 74 53 57 376 
Source: Census data, 2007 (N=376), including all sites (Scoones et al 2010: 53) 
 
Farm workers made up 11.5% of households in the A1 villagised sites, with many taking an 
active role in the land invasions. In one case a farm worker organised and led the invasion of 
the farm where he had worked. Given that in other parts of the country, farm workers were 
displaced in large numbers, often ending up destitute, living in camps on the farms (Chambati 
this issue), this is perhaps surprising. Yet this reflects the extent and nature of labour on the 
former large-scale farms in Masvingo province. Unlike in the Highveld farms, where large, 
resident labour forces existed without nearby communal homes, our Masvingo study sites were 
formerly large-scale ranches where labour was limited, and workers came, often on a temporary 
basis, from nearby communal areas, and were not permanent residents attracted originally as 
migrant labour from nearby countries.  
 
Across all of these categories are ‘war veterans’. As household heads they make up 8.8% of the 
total population. The category ‘war veteran’ is however diverse and again perhaps misleading. 
Prior to the land invasions, most were farming in the communal areas, a few were living in town, 
while some were civil servants, business people and employees in the security services. At the 
time of the land invasions in 2000, many indeed had long dropped their ‘war veteran’ identity 
and had been poor, small-scale farmers in the communal areas for 20 years since the end of 
the liberation war. Those who led the land invasions were often able to secure land in the A1 
self-contained plots, but many were sidelined in the allocation of larger A2 farms. However, 
most were not well connected politically before 2000, although through the Zimbabwe National 
Liberation War Veterans Association, they became so and part of the political drive towards land 
reform, although with multiple disputes with the party leadership (Sadomba 2011). 
 
Land was allocated unevenly to men and women. In most cases it is men whose names appear 
on the ‘offer letters’, the permits issued to new settlers by the government. Yet women were 
important players in the land invasions, providing support to the base camps during the 
‘jambanja’ period, and subsequently investing in the development of new homes and farms, as 
wives, sisters, daughters, aunts and so on.  However, across our sample only 12% of 
households had a woman named as the land holder on the permit. The highest proportion of 
such cases was in the informal settlements, as women often saw the land invasions as an 
opportunity to make a new independent life and escape abusive relationships or accusations of 
witchcraft, for example (cf. Manjengwa and Mazhawidza, this issue). 
 
So who amongst these groups are the so-called ‘cronies’ of the party, well-connected to the 
machinery of the state and able to gain advantage? As discussed above, those able to gain land 
through patronage included those who grabbed often large farms around 2008, as well as some 
of the A2 farmers able to manipulate the system. While the A2 farmers in our sample are 
certainly more ‘elite’ than those who invaded farms and took on small A1 farms, many could not 
be described as rich or politically well-connected. Former teachers, extension workers, office 
clerks and small-scale business people dominate this group. Others however have political 
connections that have allowed them access to patronage support from the state during the last 
decade. These are often absentee land owners – so-called ‘cell phone farmers’ – presiding over 
often under-utilised land, perhaps with a decaying new tractor in the farmyard. Yet, despite their 
disproportionate influence on local politics, these well-connected elites are few-and-far between, 
making up around 5% of the total population in our study areas (see the categories ‘cell phone 
farmer’ and ‘farming from patronage’ in Table 3, for example). A few gained access to farms 
with good irrigation infrastructure (such as in the sugar estates), but there is no consistent 
pattern in their distribution, as others took on dryland ranches. Perhaps because of the distance 
from Harare, the relatively poorer agro-ecological conditions, the lack of high value 
infrastructure and the particular local political configurations, in Masvingo province such elite 
capture is not the dominant story, despite the media assumptions. Masvingo is of course not 
Mazowe or Marondera, but even in such Highveld areas the situation is much more diverse than 
what mainstream portrayals suggest with the new land reform areas dominated by smallholder 
farmers in A1 schemes, as Matondi (2010) and Sadomba (2011) attest for Mazowe, for 
example.  
 
How much land did each of these groups get? Table 5 shows this for each of the scheme types, 
dividing the A2 sites into irrigated and dryland farms. For the A1 villagised and informal sites, 
the area measurements refer only to arable land, while for the other sites it represents the whole 
allocation to the households. Land cleared represents that where arable fields had been created 
and cultivated in 2007-08. The data shows that, for each of the scheme types, so-called 
‘ordinary’ settlers did not receive any less land than other groups; in some cases more. 
Business people and civil servants were able to clear more land in most instances, due to 
access to resources to hire labour. Those linked to the security services – the group most likely 
to be associated with the political-military elite – received marginally more land than the average 
in the A1 self-contained and informal sites, but less in other sites.  
 
As Table 5 shows, the different ‘scheme’ types thus create a pattern of differentiation within the 
land reform areas, with A1 villagised and informal sites receiving the least arable land, although 
with access to communal grazing (not included in the data). A1 self-contained land (including 
both arable and grazing) is larger, and where the highest areas of land cleared for production 
are observed. But it is the relatively small number of A2 farmers who receive the largest land 
areas, including some large ranches in the dryland areas, where very limited areas are cleared 
for arable production, as well as often quite large plots with irrigation potential. Compared to the 
small-scale farmers on the A1 schemes where intensive mixed farming has taken off, the A2 
farmers have found the establishment of new farms much more difficult. With larger areas, the 
need for equipment and labour, as well as financial investment, the economic conditions 
pertaining for much of the study period made getting new enterprises going was very difficult. 
This is reflected in the relatively low areas cleared and low stocking rates, for instance.  
 
Table 5: Land owned and cleared by settler and scheme type  
 
 A1 villagised 
A1 self-
contained 
Informal A2 dryland 
 
A2 irrigated 
 
 
Ha 
owned 
Ha 
cleared 
Ha 
owned 
Ha 
cleared 
Ha 
owned 
Ha 
cleared 
Ha 
owned 
Ha 
cleared 
Ha 
owned 
Ha 
cleared 
‘Ordinary’ 
– rural 
4.8 3.8 31.9 9.3 6.6 5.1 247.0 7.0 - - 
‘Ordinary’ 
– urban 
4.1 3.5 35.1 9.3 6.6 5.4 194.5 3.5 84.5 31.2 
Civil 
servant 
4.1 3.5 35.5 7.3 7.5 5.3 248.3 16.0 67.8 24.4 
Security 
services 
3.8 3.5 36.3 9.7 6.7 6.5 - - 54.0 9.0 
Business 
person 
4.0 4.0 36.4 14.1 - - 272.0 5.0 39.6 32.5 
Farm 
worker 
4.4 3.9 29.0 8.5 8.0 4.0 - - - - 
 
Average 
 
4.6 3.8 33.9 8.9 6.7 5.1 232.0 8.7 70.2 27.3 
Source: Census data, 2007 (A2 dryland excludes Asveld farm due to lack of area data) 
 
The land reform has thus involved diverse people with multiple affiliations. Being influential in 
the land invasions, war veterans often managed to secure better plots, although not always 
larger ones11. We were unable to ascertain party affiliation of those on our sites, but figures from 
recent elections suggest that there are significant numbers of MDC opposition supporters in 
these areas, even if they do not admit this publicly12. Given the often violent clashes associated 
with electoral politics, especially linked to ZANU-PF youth militia, many sensible people carry a 
ZANU-PF party card, even if they vote for the opposition. Many of those who joined the land 
invasions could not be regarded as ‘cronies’ in any reasonable sense; many had no party 
affiliation, they were simply interested in gaining access to land so long denied them13. While 
the land invasions clearly became highly politicised, and the atmosphere of the ‘base camps’ on 
the invaded farms was tightly ordered and politically controlled (Chaumba et al 2003), those 
who ultimately benefited were much more diverse than those with close political ties. Again, as 
discussed above, who got the land in the A1 sites very much depended on the very particular 
dynamics of an individual invasion, who was leading it and how contested the farm was.   
 
The large group of civil servants, particularly on the A2 plots - and in our sample especially in 
the sugar estates - were often teachers, agricultural extension workers and local government 
officials. While not being poor and landless from the communal areas, most could not be 
regarded as elite, nor often particularly well-connected politically. Indeed, in simple financial 
terms many were extremely poor, as government wages had effectively ceased during the 
economic crisis to 2009.  
 
The net result is a new mix of people in the new resettlements. In the A2 schemes, for example 
46.5% of new farmers have a ‘Master Farmer’ certificate14, while in the A1 self-contained 
schemes 17.6% do. 91.6% of A2 farmers had at least three years of secondary schooling, while 
this proportion is 71.6% and 44.8% in the A1 self-contained and villagised schemes 
respectively. The new resettlements are dominated by a new generation of farmers, with most 
household heads being under 50, many born since Independence. A2 schemes are dominated 
by the over 40s, but often include people with significant experience and connections. That 
overall 18.3% of households came from urban areas (increasing to 43.8% in the A2 schemes) is 
significant too, as connections to town have proved important in gaining access to services and 
support in the absence of official programmes in the rural areas.  
 
These data from Masvingo province are reflected in other studies from other areas of the 
country (Moyo et al 2009; Matondi 2010 and contributions to this issue reviewed by Cliffe et al). 
The overall picture is complex, but a simple narrative that land reform has been dominated by 
grabbing by elites is clearly inaccurate. Land previously occupied by a single farmer, often 
absent but with a manager and a few workers resident, is now being used by a highly diverse 
group of people. Overall, the new resettlements are populated by younger, more educated 
                                               
11
 War veterans had land areas above the average in the A1 villagised schemes only (at 6.8ha). In all 
other instances their land holdings were actually on average marginally lower than the average. 
12
 The MDC-T party won in seven of the 15 constituencies across the four districts of our study area  in 
the 2008 parliamentary election, taking 41.2% of the vote, against ZANU-PF’s 52.3%. ZANU-PF 
maintained its stronghold in Mwenezi and Chiredzi districts, but lost in Gutu and parts of Masvingo district 
(Scoones et al, 2010:29). 
13
 In this respect, we disagree with Zamchiya’s analysis (this issue) which assumes that nearly everyone 
is a ‘crony’ and/or a ‘party supporter’, rather than accepting that people switch allegiance opportunistically 
to gain strategic advantage, as described by Mkodzongi (this issue). Such an alternative interpretation 
recognises the complexity and contradictions of public and private politics in the highly contested 
Zimbabwe setting, which of course varies significantly by region. 
14
 A quite rigorous agricultural qualification, the result of training by the ministry of agriculture’s extension 
arm. 
people with a greater diversity of backgrounds, professional skills and connections than their 
neighbours in the communal areas and old resettlements.  
 
The land reform has resulted in a new social composition of people on the land, with a diversity 
of people from different backgrounds, with new skills, connections and sources of capital for 
investing in production. The new resettlements are therefore not a replication of the 1980s 
resettlement schemes or an extension of the communal areas, nor are they simply scaled-down 
version of large-scale commercial farms. Instead, a very different social and economic dynamic 
is unfolding, one that has multiple potentials, as well as challenges.  
 
 
Investing in the land 
 
One of the recurrent myths about Zimbabwe’s land reform is that investment has been 
insignificant in the new resettlements: the land lies idle, people are not committed to farming 
and infrastructure is destroyed, neglected or non-existent. Perceptions of a lack of order and 
poor tenure security have further contributed to this view. Many assume that investment will not 
proceed without legally enforceable property rights, yet in our sites no leases have been agreed, 
and in some sites ‘offer letters’ (permits to occupy issued by the state) have not even been 
issued. Our studies have shown this narrative of low investment, disorder and lack of 
development is far from the case. Unlike the old resettlements which were plagued by a sense 
of insecurity, at least in the 1980s, due to the permit system and top-down imposition of 
planning requirements (Bruce 1990), it seems that trust in local authorities, combined with 
political assurances from across the political divide, has been sufficient for many to invest 
significantly in the new resettlements. This is of course not to say that insecurities do not exist. 
In the ‘informal’ settlements, unrecognised by the state, threats of eviction continue, and 
appropriation by political elites, particularly around the 2008 election period, represented 
another source of insecurity. Certainly, unstable macroeconomic factors until 2009 added to this 
and undermined opportunities for capital investment. But, despite this, impressive strides have 
been made in clearing the land, in purchasing livestock, equipment and transport and in building 
new settlements.  
 
In developing their farms, most new farmers have had to start from scratch. For the most part 
the Masvingo study sites were ranches: large expanses of bush grazing, with limited 
infrastructure. There were scattered homesteads, a few workers’ cottages, the odd dip tank, 
small dam and irrigation plot, but not much else. When groups of land invaders took the land 
they established ‘base camps’, under the leadership of war veteran commanders. Surveys of 
soil types and water sources were undertaken by the land invaders. The new settlers then 
pegged fields and marked out areas for settlement. Soon, once the official FTLRP was 
launched, officials from the government arrived and imposed an official plan, based on land use 
planning regulations, as well as much pressure to accommodate more people. Some had to 
move their shelters and clear fields anew. But, within a remarkably short time, people began to 
invest in earnest. There was an urgency: fields had to be prepared for planting, structures had 
to be built for cattle to be kraaled in, granaries had to be erected for the harvests to be stored, 
and homes had to be put up for growing numbers of people to live in.  
 
A peopled landscape of houses, fields, paths and roads soon emerged. Human population 
densities increased significantly and livestock populations grew. Stocking densities on beef 
ranches were recommended to be around one animal per ten hectares; now much larger 
livestock populations exist, combining cattle with goats, sheep, donkeys, pigs and poultry. 
Investment in stock has been significant, with cattle populations in particular growing rapidly, 
especially in the A1 sites.  
 
One of the major tasks facing new settlers has been clearing land. In A1 village sites, on 
average each household had cleared 6.8ha by 2008-09, while in A1 self-contained and A2 sites 
an average of 13.3ha and 23.7ha had been cleared. In the A1 sites most of this was being 
cultivated, while in the A2 sites much less intensive land use is observed (Table 5). In addition, 
people have constructed numerous gardens, all of which have required investment in fencing. In 
addition, people have dug wells, built small dams, planted trees and dug soil conservation 
works. Investment in fields was complemented by investment in farm equipment, with ploughs, 
cultivators, pumps and scotch carts purchased in numbers.  
 
Building has also been extensive in the new resettlements. Some structures remain built of pole 
and mud, however, after a year or two, when people’s sense of tenure security had increased, 
buildings using bricks, cement and tin/asbestos roofing increased. Some very elaborate homes 
have been built with the very best materials imported from South Africa.   
 
Transport has been a major constraint on the new resettlements. With no roads and poor 
connections to urban areas, there were often no forms of public transport available. This was 
compounded by the economic crisis, as many operators closed down routes. This had a severe 
impact. Lack of access to services – shops, schools, clinics – and markets meant that people 
suffered. Investing in a means of transport was often a major priority. Bicycles in particular were 
bought in large numbers, but also cars, pick-ups and trucks.  
 
What is the value of all this investment? A simple set of calculations which compute the cost of 
labour and materials used or the replacement cost of the particular item show that, on average, 
each household had invested over US$2000 in a variety of items in the period from settlement 
to 2008-09 (Table 6). 
 
Table 6: The value of investments in the new resettlements15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Scoones et al (2010: 87) 
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 The values were calculated using US dollar-equivalent replacement costs for labour, materials, 
equipment etc., based on an average investment per household across the full sample of 400 cases 
(Scoones et al 2010: 77-87). 
Focus of 
investment  
Average value of investment per household (US$)  
Land clearance  $385  
Housing/buildings  $631  
Cattle  $612  
Farm equipment  $198  
Transport  $150  
Toilets  $77  
Garden fencing  $29  
Wells  $79  
Total  $2161  
This is of course only a small subset of the total, as such private investment does not account 
for investments at the community level. Across our sites, churches have been established, 
schools have been built, roads cut and areas for shops carved out as part of community efforts. 
Labour and materials have been mobilised without any external help. In the A1 sites in particular 
this highly-motivated and well-organised pattern of self-help has dominated (cf. Murisa, this 
issue). While the state has been present, it has not always been helpful. The re-planning of 
village and field sites was resented by many, as the land use planning models dating from the 
1930s were re-imposed, with fields removed from near rivers and streams and villages placed 
on the ridges far from water sources. Planning laws were also invoked in the destruction of 
nascent business centres as part of Operation Murambatsvina (Potts 2008).  
 
Extension workers are few-and-far-between and veterinary care almost non-existent. Instead, 
people have used their own knowledge, skills and connections in developing their agriculture, 
often relying on those with Master Farmer qualifications which they had gained in their former 
homes in the communal areas. Without dipping, the explosion of tick-borne animal diseases has 
been devastating, but many farmers have purchased spray-on chemicals, often organising 
themselves in groups to tackle the problem.  
 
So without the state and without the projects of donors and NGOs – and significantly without 
formal title or leasehold tenure - the new settlers have invested at scale. Extrapolating the 
results from our sample and for the limited set of items assessed to the whole province this 
adds up to an investment of US$91m across all new resettlements; a substantial amount by any 
calculation (Scoones et al 2010:86). Such a level of investment suggests that in most 
resettlement sites (perhaps with the exception of the ‘informal’ sites, where no ‘offer letters’ 
have been issued) there is a sufficient sense of security of tenure to allow investment at scale, 
undermining the claim that what is needed now is a formalisation of tenure regimes and the 
offering of some form of title (Matondi 2010).  
 
But is this an argument that people can just do it on their own, and should be left to their own 
devices? Emphatically: no. There are plenty of things that need to be done, and where external 
support is necessary. In order to get farming moving in the new resettlements a significant 
investment in infrastructure – roads, wells, dams, dips and so on – will be needed. This is 
unlikely to come from individual and community contributions, although the considerable 
entrepreneurial initiative and deep commitment to investment in the new resettlements is an 
important platform on which to build. 
 
A smallholder agricultural revolution in the making? 
 
A recurrent myth about Zimbabwe’s land reform is that it has resulted in agricultural collapse, 
precipitating widespread and recurrent food insecurity. There is little doubt that the agricultural 
sector has been transformed, as discussed above, but our data show that there has been 
surprising resilience in production. 
 
Take maize production on the resettlement farms in Masvingo province. We tracked production 
on all 400 farms in our sample over seven seasons between 2002 and 2009 (Table 7). The data 
shows a steady increase in output over time as farms became established, and draft power and 
other inputs were sourced. The trend was not smooth, however, and the major droughts in this 
period saw low yields. Availability of seeds and fertiliser was also highly variable across years, 
with various government schemes delivering patchily and unreliably. And patterns of 
differentiation across households were also very evident.  
 
Table 7: Percent of farmers harvesting greater than a tonne of maize 
 
District 
Scheme 
Type 
2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 
Gutu 
 
 
A1 self-
contained 
18.4 50.0 45.5 75.0 63.4 28.6 61.5 
A1 
villagised 
13.3 39.1 24.0 79.3 63.3 36.7 78.6 
A2 0.0 0.0 44.4 75.0 66.7 n.d 63.6 
Masvingo 
 
 
A1 self-
contained 
55.3 63.2 56.4 100.0 100.0 51.3 100.0 
A1 
villagised 
28.0 38.1 45.8 95.7 91.2 15.8 77.9 
A2 0.0 25.0 25.0 n.d 75.0 75.0 100.0 
Chiredzi 
A2 14.3 38.5 46.2 50.0 66.7 50.0 88.9 
Informal 18.8 10.2 3.9 86.5 51.0 24.5 62.5 
Mwenezi 
A1 
villagised 
26.9 8.0 0.0 4.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 Informal 11.5 11.5 0.0 0.0 26.7 6.7 0.0 
Source: Maize census, 2003-09 (N=400; n.d = no data) (Scoones et al 2010: 108) 
 
As Table 7 shows, in the better rainfall years of 2005-06 and 2008-09 the proportion of 
households producing more than a tonne of maize – sufficient to feed an average family for a 
year - was significant across all sites. For example, following the 2009 harvest between 63% 
and 100% of households outside the lowveld sites in Mwenezi produced more than this 
threshold. If sorghum and millet were added to the tally, more than 60% of households, even in 
the dryland Mwenezi sites, produced sufficient for self-provisioning. Surpluses may be sold or 
stored, providing a buffer for future years. Around a third of households sold maize, sorghum or 
millet regularly in this period. For example in 2009 two-thirds of such households in the A1 self-
contained settlement sites sold over a tonne of maize, although marketed output was not so 
high on the A2 farms, by contrast.  
 
A major constraint especially to maize production in this period, however, has been input supply 
– both of seed and fertiliser. Local production of agricultural inputs declined dramatically from 
2000 due to the economic conditions prevailing. Attempts to provide inputs through government 
programmes – whether the Agricultural Sector Productivity Enhancement Facility, Operation 
Maguta or the Champion Farmer programme – largely failed. The agricultural policy 
environment until 2009 was characterised by “heavy-handed state intervention funded through 
quasi-fiscal means which distorted markets and incentives and undermined the economy” 
(Scoones et al 2010: 99). These schemes benefited some, but they also opened up significant 
opportunities for corruption. Most new resettlement farmers had to source their own seed, 
reverting to local re-use and imports from South Africa. Fertiliser use dropped dramatically, 
although the new farmers had the benefits of relatively virgin soils for a period.  
 
By contrast, in some sites, cotton production has boomed. This is particular so in the ‘informal’ 
site of Uswaushava in the Nuanetsi ranch. Here cotton production has increased significantly 
(Table 8). Cotton sales provide significant cash income for nearly all households. Six different 
private cotton companies operate in the area, supplying credit, inputs and marketing support - 
allowing cotton producers to access inputs and other support through other means. New cotton 
gins have opened up too, creating employment further up the value chain.  
 
Table 8: Changes in cotton production in Uswhaushava, Chiredzi cluster, 2001-2008 harvests 
 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
% farmers growing cotton 18% 35% 29% 35% 29% 68% 92% 89% 
For cotton farmers, average area 
planted to cotton (ha) 
1 1.5 1.6 1.4 1.4 1.7 1.7 2.1 
For cotton farmers, average output 
of cotton (bales = 200kg) 
2.3 1.7 0.8 1.6 0.6 5.8 7.5 6.4 
Source: Annual crop census (Scoones et al, 2010: 114) 
 
Investment in cattle has been particularly important across the sites, but particularly in the A1 
schemes, and for certain ‘success groups’16 (Table 9). Contrary to the pattern noted by Dekker 
and Kinsey (this issue) for the old resettlement areas, cattle numbers are increasing in the new 
resettlement areas, providing an important source of draft power, milk, meat and cash sale and 
savings. Particularly dramatic increases in holdings since settlement are seen in the A1-self 
contained sites (across all ‘success groups’), and in the top success group in the A1 villagised 
and informal sites. Again, by contrast, the A2 farmers were accumulating less, often because of 
disease outbreaks and theft. 
 
Table 9: Mean cattle holdings: changes by scheme type and success group  
 
Scheme type 
Success Group 1 Success Group 2 Success Group 3 
At settlement 2008 At settlement 2008 At settlement 2008 
A1 villagised 6.3 10.4 4.5 4.5 1.9 2.6 
A1 self-
contained 
11.2 16.2 1.3 10.9 0.9 3.7 
A2 18.9 20.5 13.6 14.8 11.1 4.4 
Informal 7.5 12.5 4.5 3.8 0.0 0.5 
Source: Survey data, 2007-08 (N=177) (Scoones et al 2010: 118) 
 
Markets are key to the resettlement farming enterprises, and these are expanding in new ways 
around different commodities (see Mavedzenge et al 2008, for example, for livestock). These 
are new markets, often operating informally, sometimes illegally. Compared to those that 
existed before, they have been radically reconfigured by the restructuring of the agrarian 
economy following land reform and deeply affected by the economic crisis that plagued the 
country for much of the past decade. Detailed studies by Mutopo (this issue), for example, show 
the gendered dimensions of such new informal markets, as well as their impressive dynamism. 
Yet, since they are evolving at such a pace, it is difficult to keep track of how agricultural 
markets work, and formal data on agricultural production and sales is very shaky indeed; and 
inevitably highly politicised with different arms of government and different international 
agencies presenting figures, based on very little ground-truthing, to support a particular view. 
The statistical basis for assessing the success or otherwise of land reform at a national level 
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 As discussed above, this is the local characterisation of ‘success’ used in the study to differentiate 
settlers, with success group 1 being the most ‘successful’ according to local criteria. Cattle ownership and 
accumulation was, unsurprisingly, one of the key indicators. 
thus remains extremely limited, and so detailed local studies of the form of production and the 
functioning of markets are essential to build a more complete picture. 
 
While across our research sites there are of course some who produce little and have to rely on 
local markets or support from relatives, overall we did not find a pattern of production failure, 
widespread food insecurity and lack of market integration. On the contrary, we found a highly 
differentiated picture, but one which has at its centre smallholder  agricultural production and 
marketing; one that could, given the right support, be the core of a new ‘green revolution’ in 
Zimbabwe. By contrast to the previous boom in smallholder production in the early 1980s 
following Independence, the Masvingo sample suggests a larger proportion of farmers is 
involved. Around half are succeeding as ‘middle farmers’ and a third as highly commercialised 
producers, compared to only 20% in the 1980s (cf. Stanning 1989); and of course at a much 
larger scale than the rather isolated successes of that earlier period (Eicher 1995, Rohrbach 
1989). 
  
Dynamic local economies 
 
Of course on-farm success can result in off-farm economic growth, as linkages are forged in 
local economies (cf. Delgado et al 1989). This is an important dynamic in the new resettlement 
areas, given the geographical juxtaposition of new resettlement areas of different types, with old 
communal and resettlement areas. Since 2000, the rural economy has been radically spatially 
reconfigured, with the old separated economic spheres of the large-scale farms and the 
communal areas being broken down. The result is a shift to new sites for economic activity, 
connected to new value chains and new sorts of entrepreneur, linking town and countryside.  
 
The dynamic entrepreneurialism resulting should, we argue, not be underestimated and 
represents an important resource to build on. Across our sites, we have small-scale irrigators 
producing horticultural products for local and regional markets; we have highly successful cotton 
producers who are generating considerable profits by selling to a wide number of competing 
private sector companies; we have livestock producers and traders who are developing new 
value chains for livestock products, linked to butcheries, supermarkets and other outlets; we 
have traders in wild products, often engaged in highly profitable export markets; and we have 
others who are developing contract farming and joint venture arrangements, for a range of 
products, including wildlife. We also have an important group of sugar producers with A2 plots 
on the lowveld estates who, very often against the odds due to shortages of inputs, unreliable 
electricity supplies and disadvantageous pricing, have been delivering cane to the mills, as well 
as other diverse markets, alongside diversification into irrigated horticulture production on their 
plots. 
 
The new farmers are also employing labour (Table 10; see Chambati, this issue). This is often 
casual, low-paid employment, often of women, but it is an important source of livelihood for 
many – including those who are not making it as part of the new ‘middle farmer’ group identified 
above. The new resettlements sites have become a magnet for others, and households on 
average have grown by around three members since settlement through the in-migration of 
relatives and labourers (cf. Deininger et al., 2004 for discussion of a similar dynamic in the old 
resettlement areas). On average, A2 farm households have employed 5.1 permanent workers 
and regularly employ 7.3 temporary labourers, while those households in A1 schemes and in 
informal resettlement sites employ on average 0.5 permanent workers and 1.9 temporary 
labourers. Comparing this level of employment with what existed before on the former cattle 
ranches, where perhaps one herder was employed for each 100 animals grazed over 1000ha, 
the scale of employment generation afforded by the new resettlement farms is considerable. 
 
Table 10: Patterns of permanent and temporary labour hiring for cropping and livestock rearing 
 
  A1 and informal A2 
  
Tempor
ary 
croppin
g  
Tempor
ary 
livestoc
k  
Perman
ent 
both  
Perman
ent 
croppin
g  
Perman
ent 
livestoc
k  
Tempor
ary 
croppin
g  
Tempor
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k  
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both  
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croppin
g  
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livestoc
k  
Percent
age of 
hhs 
employi
ng 
workers 
20 13 9 11 9.3 67.6 43.5 44.8 71.9 43.3 
% of 
these 
female 
48 31 26 32 25 27 7 23 26 28 
Source: Survey, 2007-08 (N=177) (Scoones et al 2010:132) 
 
There is frequently a sense of optimism and future promise amongst many resettlement farmers 
we have worked with. SM from Mwenezi district commented “We are happier here at 
resettlement. There is more land, stands are larger and there is no overcrowding. We got good 
yields this year. I filled two granaries with sorghum. I hope to buy a grinding mill and locate it at 
my homestead”. Comparing the farming life to other options, PC from Masvingo district 
observed: “We are not employed, but we are getting higher incomes than those at work”. 
Despite the hardships and difficulties – of which there are many – there is a deep commitment 
to making the new resettlement enterprises work. 
 
Future policy challenges 
  
Despite the political and economic challenges that Zimbabwe continues to face (Raftopolous 
2010), along with outstanding legal challenges and concerns of the international community, 
there is a broad consensus that Zimbabwe’s land reform is not reversible. To move ahead, a 
sustainable and democratic political settlement is clearly an essential precursor, one that 
balances rights (of different sorts, and not only those over former private freehold property) and 
redistribution (and so issues of equity, broad participation in economic activity and redress of 
historical disadvantage). But whatever new political alliance runs the country in the future, a 
major challenge remains: what should be done in the new resettlements to build a sustainable, 
growth-oriented agricultural base? As we found in Masvingo, and others have discovered 
elsewhere in the country, there is much to build on in terms of basic investment, as well as the 
skills and knowledge of the new settlers. The challenge is a new one however for agricultural 
research and development. As the head of extension in the province put it: “We don’t know our 
new clients: this is a totally new scenario”17. Responding to this scenario requires careful 
thought. As discussed, the new resettlement areas are not a replication of the communal areas, 
nor are they a scaled-down version of the old commercial sector. These are very different 
places with new people with new production systems engaging in new markets – all with new 
opportunities and challenges. The new farmers are often highly educated, well-connected and 
with important skills. Support for marketing or input supply via mobile phone updates, or 
agricultural extension or business planning advice offered via the Internet offer real 
opportunities, for example.  If given the right support, we argue, the emergent group of new 
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 Comment by the provincial agricultural extension officer at a workshop in Masvingo in 2006. 
‘middle farmers’ on the new resettlements, both A1 and A2, can drive a vibrant agricultural 
revolution in Zimbabwe (Scoones et al 2010).  
 
This has of course happened before: with white commercial farmers from the 1950s and with 
communal area farmers in the 1980s (Rukuni et al 2006). But both past agricultural revolutions 
required support and commitment from outside, something that has been starkly absent in the 
past decade. Zimbabwe’s green revolution of the 1980s has been much hailed, but this was 
mostly in high potential communal areas and was quickly extinguished following structural 
adjustment. The nascent green revolution in the resettlement areas potentially has far wider 
reach, both geographically and socio-economically.  But if the new resettlements are to 
contribute to local livelihoods, national food security and broader economic development, they 
unquestionably require investment and support. This means infrastructure (dams, roads), 
financing (credit systems), input supply (fertilizer, seed), technology (intermediate and 
appropriate) and institutions and policies that allow agriculture to grow.  
 
Getting agriculture moving on the new resettlements through building on existing achievements 
must be central priority for policy today.  What should the top priorities be now? A commentary 
on our book’s conclusions, suggested that these were merely ‘gestural’ and would surely be 
made irrelevant by the on-going political contests at the national level18. Yet the existence of a 
pervasive, violent, militarised corrupt politics, which entrenches certain positions and dominates 
a negative cycle of elite capture, does not mean that there are no countervailing forces, driven 
by other interests. We believe that the political struggle for an accountable, democratic politics 
must be linked to changing practices on the ground, and to energised policy thinking that takes 
the new realities into account. With a new progressive narrative on land and rural development, 
for example, a new vision for Zimbabwe might yet emerge which cuts across currently extreme 
politically-entrenched divisions. This means, we suggest, that engaging with a future policy 
agenda is not simply irrelevant hand waving, but a practical means to realise broader, widely 
shared, goals. Here we identify three inter-related challenges. 
 
First, security of land tenure is an essential prerequisite for successful production and 
investment in agriculture. Tenure security arises through a variety of means. Existing legislation 
allows for a wide range of potential tenure types, including freehold title, regulated leases, 
permits and communal tenure under ‘traditional’ systems. All have their pros and cons. 
Policymakers must ask how tenure security can be achieved within available resources and 
capacity; how safeguards can be put in place to prevent land grabbing or land concentration; 
and what assurances must be made to ensure that private credit markets function effectively. 
Lessons from across the world suggest there is no one-size-fits-all solution centred on freehold 
tenure (World Bank 2003), despite its continued allure in the Zimbabwe debate (Rukuni et al 
2009). 
 
Instead, a flexible system of land administration is required – one that allows for expansion and 
contraction of farm sizes, as well as entry and exit from farming. Informal (actually illegal) land 
rental markets are already emerging on some sites, allowing land transfers to occur. While the 
excesses of elite patronage and land grabbing must be addressed through a land audit, a 
successful approach, overseen by an independent, decentralised authority, must not be reliant 
on technocratic diktat on farm sizes, business plans and tenure types alone. This will mean 
investing in land governance - building the effectiveness of local institutions to manage 
resources, resolve disputes and negotiate land access in clear and accountable ways. Without 
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attention to these issues, conflicts will escalate as uncertainties over authority and control 
persist. This will have damaging consequences for both livelihoods and environmental 
sustainability. Support for rebuilding public authority from below must therefore be high on the 
agenda, linked to a revitalisation of local government capacity. Only with this longer-term effort, 
will a more accountable and democratic approach to land be realised, and the depredations of a 
greedy elite avoided. 
 
Second, as discussed above, land reform has reconfigured Zimbabwe’s rural areas 
dramatically. No longer are there vast swathes of commercial land separated from the densely-
packed communal areas. The rural landscape is now virtually all populated. Links between the 
new resettlements and communal and former resettlement areas are important, with exchanges 
of labour, draft animals, finance, skills and expertise flowing in all directions. As a result, 
economic linkages between agriculture and wider markets have changed dramatically.  
 
This has given rise to the growth of new businesses to provide services and consumption 
goods, many only now getting going. Yet the potentials for economic diversification – in small-
scale mining, hunting, cross-border trade and a host of other enterprises – are currently 
constrained by legal and regulatory restrictions. While a regulatory framework will always be 
required, it must not be excessively and inappropriately restrictive. Businesses must be 
encouraged to flourish in support of rural livelihoods, capturing synergies with local agricultural 
production. 
 
To make the most of the new mosaic of land uses and economic activities, an area-based, local 
economic development approach is required. This would facilitate investment across activities, 
adding value to farm production. Today, with a new set of players engaged in local economic 
activity, many possibilities open up. An area-based approach needs to draw in the private 
sector, farmer groups and government agencies, but with strong leadership from a revived local 
government, with rethought mandates and rebuilt capacities. Investing in such capacities and 
building local economies will in turn improve sources of local revenue beyond patronage and so 
build systems of local accountability. 
 
Third, reflecting a wide range of interests, the new resettlement farmers are highly diverse in 
class, gender and generational terms. This diversity has many advantages, adding new skills 
and experiences, but it is also a weakness. Formal organisation in the new resettlements is 
limited. The structures that formed the basis of the land invasions – the base commanders and 
the Committees of Seven, for example – have given way to other arrangements, and there is 
often limited collective solidarity. There are of course emergent organisations focused on 
particular activities – a garden, an irrigation scheme, a marketing effort, for example – but these 
are unlikely to become the basis of political representation and influence. Because politics has 
been so divisive in recent years, many shy away from seeing political parties as the basis for 
lobbying for change, and there are few other routes to expressing views.  
 
Building a new set of representative farmers’ organisations, linked to an influential apex body, 
will be a long-term task, and will be highly dependent on the unfolding political alliances in rural 
areas. As we have shown, the new resettlements are characterised by an important and 
numerically large ‘middle farmer’ group. There is also a significant group of less successful 
farmers with different needs and interests. And there are those elites reliant on political 
patronage who, despite being relatively few in number, are disproportionately influential.  
 
In contrast to the past when smallholders could easily be marginalised and were courted only at 
elections for their votes, the new farmers – and particularly the burgeoning group of ‘middle 
farmers’ - now control one of the most important economic sectors in the country, and must be 
relied upon for national food supply. Today, the politics of the countryside cannot be ignored, 
and organised farmer groups may exert substantial pressure in ways that previously seemed 
unimaginable.  
 
For this reason, the debate about land, agriculture and rural development urgently in Zimbabwe 
urgently needs to move beyond the ideological posturing of ZANU-PF, wrapped up in violent 
nationalist rhetoric, or the startling silences on land issues by the opposition political parties and 
civil society. A new narrative on land is urgently needed, based firmly on the realities on the 
ground. How the new configuration of political forces will pan out in the future is a subject of 
fierce contest, but the role of diverse agrarian interests, including new small-scale farmers, will 
certainly be important. 
 
 
Reframing the debate on land in Zimbabwe 
 
The Masvingo study has challenged a number of recurrent myths about Zimbabwe’s land 
reform: for example, that there is no investment going on, that agricultural production has 
collapsed, that food insecurity is rife, that the rural economy is in precipitous decline and that 
farm labour has been totally displaced. Getting to grips with the realities on the ground is 
essential for reframing the debate. This is why solid, empirical research is so important. Only 
with these facts to hand can sensible policymaking emerge. Evidence rather than emotion must 
guide the process. While it remains essential to address abuses of the land reform programme 
according to strict criteria set by a land audit, it is also important to focus on the wider story, 
dispelling myths and engaging with the realities of the majority. 
 
Land and politics are deeply intertwined in Zimbabwe. The current impasse cannot be resolved 
by technocratic measures alone: plans, models, audits and regulations are only part of the 
picture.  A reframed debate must encompass redistribution and redress, as well as rights and 
responsibilities. The recent divisive debate on land in Zimbabwe has seen these as opposites, 
creating what has been called a ‘dangerous rupture’ in Zimbabwe’s political discourse 
(Raftopolous 2009).  
 
The past decade of land resettlement has unleashed a process of radical agrarian change. 
There are now new people on the land, engaged in multiple forms of economic activity, 
connected to diverse markets and carving out a variety of livelihoods. Bringing a broad 
perspective on rights together with a continued commitment to redistribution must be central to 
Zimbabwe’s next steps towards democratic and economic transformation. Only with land viewed 
as a source of livelihood and redistributed economic wealth, and not as a political weapon or 
source of patronage, will the real potentials of Zimbabwe’s land reform be fully realised.  
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